Abstract : We argue civic virtue plays as a key role in explaining the design of public insurance against unemployment risks by solving moral hazard issues wich hinder the efficiency of unemployement insurance. We show, in a simple model, that economies with stronger civic virtues are more prone to provide insurance through unemployment benefits rather than though job protection. We provide cross-country and the design of unemployment benefits and employment protection in OECD countries over the period 1980 to 2003. We then use an epidemiological approach to estimate the existence of a potential causal relationship from inherited civic virtue to labor market insurance instituion.
Type de document :
Article dans une revue
American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, 2009, 1 (1), pp.111-145. 〈10.1257/mac.1.1.111〉
https://hal-pjse.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00812847
Contributeur : Caroline Bauer
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Soumis le : vendredi 12 avril 2013 - 21:42:40
Dernière modification le : jeudi 6 décembre 2018 - 01:49:30
