Optimal rationing within a heterogeneous population

Abstract : A government agency delegates to a provider (hospital, medical gatekeeper, school, social worker) the decision to supply a service or treatment to individual recipients. The agency does not perfectly know the distribution of individual treatment costs in the population. The single-crossing property is not satisfied when the uncertainty pertains to the dispersion of the distribution. We find that the provision of service should be distorted upward when the first-best efficient number of recipients is sufficiently high.
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Article dans une revue
Journal of Public Economic Theory, Wiley, 2017, 19 (3), pp.732-738. 〈10.1111/jpet.12220〉
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Soumis le : mercredi 8 novembre 2017 - 12:23:40
Dernière modification le : mardi 24 avril 2018 - 17:20:16

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Philippe Choné, Stéphane Gauthier. Optimal rationing within a heterogeneous population. Journal of Public Economic Theory, Wiley, 2017, 19 (3), pp.732-738. 〈10.1111/jpet.12220〉. 〈hal-01630879〉

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