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Optimal rationing within a heterogeneous population

Abstract : A government agency delegates to a provider (hospital, medical gatekeeper, school, social worker) the decision to supply a service or treatment to individual recipients. The agency does not perfectly know the distribution of individual treatment costs in the population. The single-crossing property is not satisfied when the uncertainty pertains to the dispersion of the distribution. We find that the provision of service should be distorted upward when the first-best efficient number of recipients is sufficiently high.
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Submitted on : Wednesday, November 8, 2017 - 12:23:40 PM
Last modification on : Friday, August 5, 2022 - 2:49:41 PM

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Philippe Choné, Stéphane Gauthier. Optimal rationing within a heterogeneous population. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2017, 19 (3), pp.732-738. ⟨10.1111/jpet.12220⟩. ⟨hal-01630879⟩



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