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Journal Articles Journal of Public Economic Theory Year : 2017

Optimal rationing within a heterogeneous population


A government agency delegates to a provider (hospital, medical gatekeeper, school, social worker) the decision to supply a service or treatment to individual recipients. The agency does not perfectly know the distribution of individual treatment costs in the population. The single-crossing property is not satisfied when the uncertainty pertains to the dispersion of the distribution. We find that the provision of service should be distorted upward when the first-best efficient number of recipients is sufficiently high.

Dates and versions

hal-01630879 , version 1 (08-11-2017)



Philippe Choné, Stéphane Gauthier. Optimal rationing within a heterogeneous population. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2017, 19 (3), pp.732-738. ⟨10.1111/jpet.12220⟩. ⟨hal-01630879⟩
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