Centralized Decision Making and Informed Lobbying

Abstract : We address the trade-off between centralized and decentralized decision making subject to influence from privately informed lobbies. We focus on informative equilibria with separating differentiable contribution schedules and identify an information transmission effect under centralized structures. Such effect decreases capture and increases welfare when lobbies have "aligned preferences." The opposite effect holds for "polarized preferences." We present two examples of this framework: local public goods and customs union agreements. Finally, we compare the policy outcomes from this political economy perspective to those under a normative mechanism design approach, and extend our analysis to the discussion of pooling equilibria.
Type de document :
Article dans une revue
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, 2017, 9 (4), pp.324-355. 〈10.1257/mic.20150253〉
Liste complète des métadonnées

https://hal-pjse.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01631111
Contributeur : Caroline Bauer <>
Soumis le : mercredi 8 novembre 2017 - 16:49:43
Dernière modification le : jeudi 11 janvier 2018 - 06:28:13

Identifiants

Collections

Citation

Rafael Costa Lima, Humberto Moreira, Thierry Verdier. Centralized Decision Making and Informed Lobbying. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, 2017, 9 (4), pp.324-355. 〈10.1257/mic.20150253〉. 〈hal-01631111〉

Partager

Métriques

Consultations de la notice

79