How to Win a Decision in a Confederation

Abstract : This paper deals with collective decision making within a group of independent states. The right to choose the public policy is delegated from the central authority to one of the states through a bidding procedure among the group state members. We identify the following tradeoff: competition among states yields higher transfers to the central authority, but the outcome tends to be less efficient than what it is when states negotiate prior to the decision making process. We extend and illustrate the model by means of a public good game involving several heterogeneous states.
Type de document :
Article dans une revue
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, 2005, 89 (7), pp.1191-1210. 〈10.1016/j.jpubeco.2003.04.001〉
Liste complète des métadonnées

https://hal-pjse.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00754075
Contributeur : Caroline Bauer <>
Soumis le : mardi 20 novembre 2012 - 08:41:37
Dernière modification le : vendredi 1 décembre 2017 - 01:19:39

Identifiants

Collections

Citation

Philippe Jehiel, Jacques-François Thisse. How to Win a Decision in a Confederation. Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, 2005, 89 (7), pp.1191-1210. 〈10.1016/j.jpubeco.2003.04.001〉. 〈halshs-00754075〉

Partager

Métriques

Consultations de la notice

140