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Départ à la retraite et taxation optimale

Abstract : It is often argued that implicit taxation on continued activity of elderly workers is responsible for the widely observed trend towards early retirement. In a world of laissez-faire or of first-best efficiency, there would be no such implicit taxation. This raises the question of whether a bias in the benefit formula in favor of early retirement is necessarily the sign of a bad policy. We show that this implicit tax on potsponed retirement can be due to the desire by public authorities of using social security for redistribution when non-distortionary tools are not available. We also examine possible ways to mitigate these distorsions, for instance, through disability testing.
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Submitted on : Tuesday, November 20, 2012 - 8:43:10 AM
Last modification on : Tuesday, January 25, 2022 - 1:48:01 PM


  • HAL Id : halshs-00754098, version 1



Pierre Pestieau, Helmuth Cremer, Jean-Marie Lozachmeur. Départ à la retraite et taxation optimale. Revue d'Economie Politique, Dalloz, 2005, 115 (2), pp.197-211. ⟨halshs-00754098⟩



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