Optimal use of communication resources

Abstract : We study a repeated game with asymmetric information about a dynamic state of nature. In the course of the game, the better-informed player can communicate some or all of his information to the other. Our model covers costly and/or bounded communication. We characterize the set of equilibrium payoffs and contrast these with the communication equilibrium payoffs, which by definition entail no communication costs.
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Article dans une revue
Econometrica, Econometric Society, 2006, 74 (6), pp.1603-1636. 〈10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00720.x〉
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Soumis le : mardi 20 novembre 2012 - 08:44:02
Dernière modification le : jeudi 11 janvier 2018 - 06:19:17

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Olivier Gossner, Pénélope Hernández, Abraham Neyman. Optimal use of communication resources. Econometrica, Econometric Society, 2006, 74 (6), pp.1603-1636. 〈10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00720.x〉. 〈halshs-00754118〉

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