Optimal use of communication resources

Abstract : We study a repeated game with asymmetric information about a dynamic state of nature. In the course of the game, the better-informed player can communicate some or all of his information to the other. Our model covers costly and/or bounded communication. We characterize the set of equilibrium payoffs and contrast these with the communication equilibrium payoffs, which by definition entail no communication costs.
Document type :
Journal articles
Complete list of metadatas

https://hal-pjse.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00754118
Contributor : Caroline Bauer <>
Submitted on : Tuesday, November 20, 2012 - 8:44:02 AM
Last modification on : Tuesday, April 24, 2018 - 5:20:09 PM

Links full text

Identifiers

Collections

Citation

Olivier Gossner, Pénélope Hernández, Abraham Neyman. Optimal use of communication resources. Econometrica, Econometric Society, 2006, 74 (6), pp.1603-1636. ⟨10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00720.x⟩. ⟨halshs-00754118⟩

Share

Metrics

Record views

322