Optimal use of communication resources

Olivier Gossner (1) , Pénélope Hernández (2) , Abraham Neyman (3)

1 PJSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques
2 Kellogg School of Management
3 Departement Fundamentos del Análisis Económico

We study a repeated game with asymmetric information about a dynamic state of nature. In the course of the game, the better-informed player can communicate some or all of his information to the other. Our model covers costly and/or bounded communication. We characterize the set of equilibrium payoffs and contrast these with the communication equilibrium payoffs, which by definition entail no communication costs.

Mots clés: Communication; Information economics; Incomplete information; Entropy; Information processing

Domaines: Economies et finances

Olivier Gossner, Pénélope Hernández, Abraham Neyman. Optimal use of communication resources. Econometrica, 2006, 74 (6), pp.1603-1636. ⟨10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00720.x⟩. ⟨halshs-00754118⟩