p-best response set and the robustness of equilibria to incomplete information

Abstract : In this paper, we use p-best response sets--a set-valued extension of p-dominance--in order to provide a new sufficient condition for the robustness of equilibria to incomplete information.
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Submitted on : Tuesday, November 20, 2012 - 8:44:56 AM
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Olivier Tercieux. p-best response set and the robustness of equilibria to incomplete information. Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, 2006, 56 (2), pp.371-384. ⟨10.1016/j.geb.2005.08.004⟩. ⟨halshs-00754138⟩

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