p-best response set and the robustness of equilibria to incomplete information

Olivier Tercieux (1)

1 PJSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques

In this paper, we use p-best response sets--a set-valued extension of p-dominance--in order to provide a new sufficient condition for the robustness of equilibria to incomplete information.

Keywords: Set-valued concepts; Incomplete information; Refinements; Robustness; p-dominance; Risk-dominance; Higher order uncertainty

Domains: Humanities and Social Sciences; Economics and Finance

Olivier Tercieux. p-best response set and the robustness of equilibria to incomplete information. Games and Economic Behavior, 2006, 56 (2), pp.371-384. ⟨10.1016/j.geb.2005.08.004⟩. ⟨halshs-00754138⟩