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Article Dans Une Revue Games and Economic Behavior Année : 2006

p-best response set and the robustness of equilibria to incomplete information

Olivier Tercieux
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Résumé

In this paper, we use p-best response sets--a set-valued extension of p-dominance--in order to provide a new sufficient condition for the robustness of equilibria to incomplete information.

Dates et versions

halshs-00754138 , version 1 (20-11-2012)

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Citer

Olivier Tercieux. p-best response set and the robustness of equilibria to incomplete information. Games and Economic Behavior, 2006, 56 (2), pp.371-384. ⟨10.1016/j.geb.2005.08.004⟩. ⟨halshs-00754138⟩
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