Reforming incentive schemes under political contraints: The physician agency

Abstract : In many developed countries attempts to reform physicians payment schemes have failed. To analyze some of the difficulties, this paper studies reforms of payment schemes in situations such as the physician agency, where the quality of the good produced is imperfectly observable by the payer. We first study the situation, common in many countries, where physicians face a single scheme. We identify conditions under which no reform can both obtain the consent of a large proportion of physicians (political constraints) and improve patients welfare. We then study whether a menu of contracts, with or without cross subsidies, may solve the difficulties generated by the heterogeneity of producers practice.
Document type :
Journal articles
Complete list of metadatas

https://hal-pjse.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00754140
Contributor : Caroline Bauer <>
Submitted on : Tuesday, November 20, 2012 - 8:45:00 AM
Last modification on : Tuesday, April 24, 2018 - 5:20:09 PM

Identifiers

  • HAL Id : halshs-00754140, version 1

Collections

Citation

Gabrielle Demange, Pierre-Yves Geoffard. Reforming incentive schemes under political contraints: The physician agency. Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, INSEE-GENES, 2006, pp.227-250. ⟨halshs-00754140⟩

Share

Metrics

Record views

221