Reforming incentive schemes under political contraints: The physician agency

Abstract : In many developed countries attempts to reform physicians payment schemes have failed. To analyze some of the difficulties, this paper studies reforms of payment schemes in situations such as the physician agency, where the quality of the good produced is imperfectly observable by the payer. We first study the situation, common in many countries, where physicians face a single scheme. We identify conditions under which no reform can both obtain the consent of a large proportion of physicians (political constraints) and improve patients welfare. We then study whether a menu of contracts, with or without cross subsidies, may solve the difficulties generated by the heterogeneity of producers practice.
Type de document :
Article dans une revue
Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, INSEE-GENES, 2006, pp.227-250
Liste complète des métadonnées

https://hal-pjse.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00754140
Contributeur : Caroline Bauer <>
Soumis le : mardi 20 novembre 2012 - 08:45:00
Dernière modification le : mardi 24 avril 2018 - 17:20:09

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : halshs-00754140, version 1

Collections

Citation

Gabrielle Demange, Pierre-Yves Geoffard. Reforming incentive schemes under political contraints: The physician agency. Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, INSEE-GENES, 2006, pp.227-250. 〈halshs-00754140〉

Partager

Métriques

Consultations de la notice

197