The political economy of xenophobia and distribution: The case of Denmark

Abstract : For the first time in some years, a conservative government came to power in Denmark in 2001, due primarily to the citizenry's disaffection with social-democratic policies on immigration. We represent political competition in Denmark as taking place over two issues--the size of the public sector and immigration--and model political equilibrium using the party unanimity Nash equilibrium (PUNE) concept, which generates equilibria on multi-dimensional policy spaces where parties form endogenously. By fitting the model to Danish data, we argue that citizen xenophobia may be expected to decrease the size of the Danish public sector by an amount between 12% and 36% of one standard deviation of the probability distribution of citizens' ideal points of the size of the public sector.
Type de document :
Article dans une revue
Scandivavian Journal of Economics, 2006, 108 (2), pp.251-278. 〈10.1111/j.1467-9442.2006.00450.x〉
Liste complète des métadonnées

https://hal-pjse.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00754146
Contributeur : Caroline Bauer <>
Soumis le : mardi 20 novembre 2012 - 08:45:27
Dernière modification le : jeudi 10 mai 2018 - 02:07:21

Lien texte intégral

Identifiants

Collections

Citation

John E. Roemer, Karine Van Der Straeten. The political economy of xenophobia and distribution: The case of Denmark. Scandivavian Journal of Economics, 2006, 108 (2), pp.251-278. 〈10.1111/j.1467-9442.2006.00450.x〉. 〈halshs-00754146〉

Partager

Métriques

Consultations de la notice

236