License auctions and market structure

Abstract : We analyze the interplay between license auctions and market structure in a model with several incumbents and several potential entrants. The focus is on the competitiveness induced by the number of auctioned licenses. Under plausible conditions, we show that auctioning more licenses need not result in a more competitive final outcome, contrary to what common sense suggests. This is due to the nature of competition among incumbents, which sometimes exhibits free-riding. We illustrate some results with examples drawn from the recent European license-auctions for third generation (3G) mobile telephony.
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Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, Wiley, 2006, 15 (2), pp.371-396. 〈10.1111/j.1530-9134.2006.00104.x〉
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Soumis le : mardi 20 novembre 2012 - 08:45:47
Dernière modification le : mardi 24 avril 2018 - 17:20:09

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Heidrun C. Hoppe, Philippe Jehiel, Benny Moldovanu. License auctions and market structure. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, Wiley, 2006, 15 (2), pp.371-396. 〈10.1111/j.1530-9134.2006.00104.x〉. 〈halshs-00754153〉

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