Addressing buyer power in merger control

Abstract : While competition authorities often take countervailing buyer power into account when assessing the competitive impact of a merger between sellers, they have so far been more reluctant to consider positively the creation or strengthening of buyer power resulting from a merger. This paper summarises the main economic mechanisms underlying the existence of market power, distinguishing between anonymous market interfaces and markets characterized by bilateral bargaining. It then draws implications for merger control, considering both buyer mergers and seller mergers.
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Article dans une revue
Concurrences - revue des droits de la concurrence, Institut de droit de la concurrence, 2008, 3-2008 (20371), pp.34-39
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Contributeur : Caroline Bauer <>
Soumis le : mardi 20 novembre 2012 - 08:52:02
Dernière modification le : mardi 24 avril 2018 - 17:20:09

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  • HAL Id : halshs-00754270, version 1

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David Spector. Addressing buyer power in merger control. Concurrences - revue des droits de la concurrence, Institut de droit de la concurrence, 2008, 3-2008 (20371), pp.34-39. 〈halshs-00754270〉

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