Regulatory Competition in Network Interconnection Pricing

Abstract : This paper covers network investment problems under decentralized control of regulation, infrastructure ownership and management. The model features two countries managing domestic infrastructures, used simultaneously for downstream international service provision. Initially, the welfare losses from non-cooperative investment financing policy and access pricing are derived. The impact of strategic interaction between the countries' access prices on the choice of financing policy is investigated. Under strict budget balancing, there are no incentives for efficiency improving investments. Further, investment coordination is shown useless in the absence of regulatory coordination. Illustrations from European network regulation policy for energy and rail are presented.
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Article dans une revue
Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, 2008, 7 (1), 〈10.2202/1446-9022.1141〉
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Soumis le : mardi 20 novembre 2012 - 08:53:54
Dernière modification le : jeudi 10 mai 2018 - 01:06:57

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Jérôme Pouyet, Peer J. Agrell. Regulatory Competition in Network Interconnection Pricing. Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, 2008, 7 (1), 〈10.2202/1446-9022.1141〉. 〈halshs-00754301〉



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