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Article Dans Une Revue Review of Network Economics Année : 2008

Regulatory Competition in Network Interconnection Pricing

Résumé

This paper covers network investment problems under decentralized control of regulation, infrastructure ownership and management. The model features two countries managing domestic infrastructures, used simultaneously for downstream international service provision. Initially, the welfare losses from non-cooperative investment financing policy and access pricing are derived. The impact of strategic interaction between the countries' access prices on the choice of financing policy is investigated. Under strict budget balancing, there are no incentives for efficiency improving investments. Further, investment coordination is shown useless in the absence of regulatory coordination. Illustrations from European network regulation policy for energy and rail are presented.

Dates et versions

halshs-00754301 , version 1 (20-11-2012)

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Jérôme Pouyet, Peer J. Agrell. Regulatory Competition in Network Interconnection Pricing. Review of Network Economics, 2008, 7 (1), ⟨10.2202/1446-9022.1141⟩. ⟨halshs-00754301⟩
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