Longevity, health spending, and pay-as-you-go pensions

Abstract : This paper aims at investigating whether or not a utilitarian social planner should subsidize longevity-enhancing expenditures in an economy with a pay-as-you-go pension system. For that purpose, a two-period overlapping-generations model is developed, in which the probability of survival to the second period can be raised by private health spending. Focusing on the steady state, it is shown that the sign of the optimal subsidy on health expenditures tends to be negative when the replacement ratio is sufficiently large. Moreover, the optimal health subsidy is also shown to depend significantly on individual preferences and on the longevity production process.
Type de document :
Article dans une revue
Finanzarchiv, 2008, 64 (1), pp.1-18
Liste complète des métadonnées

Contributeur : Caroline Bauer <>
Soumis le : mardi 20 novembre 2012 - 08:54:41
Dernière modification le : mardi 24 avril 2018 - 17:20:09


  • HAL Id : halshs-00754319, version 1



Pierre Pestieau, Grégory Ponthière, Motohiro Sato. Longevity, health spending, and pay-as-you-go pensions. Finanzarchiv, 2008, 64 (1), pp.1-18. 〈halshs-00754319〉



Consultations de la notice