Core-selecting package auctions: a comment on revenue-monotonicity

Abstract : Day and Milgrom (Int J Game Theory 36:393-407, 2008) argue that package auctions that select the seller's minimum revenue in the Core are revenue-monotone. We show that no bidder-optimal Core-selecting auction can satisfy revenue-monotonicity for general preferences when there are at least three goods for sale, while the property holds for any bidder-optimal Core-selecting auction in environments with only two goods or if the characteristic function is submodular.
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International Journal of Game Theory, Springer Verlag, 2010, 39 (3), pp.503-510. 〈10.1007/s00182-009-0188-z〉
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Soumis le : mardi 20 novembre 2012 - 09:39:47
Dernière modification le : mardi 24 avril 2018 - 17:20:14

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Laurent Lamy. Core-selecting package auctions: a comment on revenue-monotonicity. International Journal of Game Theory, Springer Verlag, 2010, 39 (3), pp.503-510. 〈10.1007/s00182-009-0188-z〉. 〈halshs-00754436〉

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