Core-selecting package auctions: a comment on revenue-monotonicity

Abstract : Day and Milgrom (Int J Game Theory 36:393-407, 2008) argue that package auctions that select the seller's minimum revenue in the Core are revenue-monotone. We show that no bidder-optimal Core-selecting auction can satisfy revenue-monotonicity for general preferences when there are at least three goods for sale, while the property holds for any bidder-optimal Core-selecting auction in environments with only two goods or if the characteristic function is submodular.
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Submitted on : Tuesday, November 20, 2012 - 9:39:47 AM
Last modification on : Tuesday, April 24, 2018 - 5:20:14 PM

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Laurent Lamy. Core-selecting package auctions: a comment on revenue-monotonicity. International Journal of Game Theory, Springer Verlag, 2010, 39 (3), pp.503-510. ⟨10.1007/s00182-009-0188-z⟩. ⟨halshs-00754436⟩

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