The Strategic Value of Quantity Forcing Contracts

Abstract : We explore the strategic value of quantity forcing contracts in a manufacturer-retailer environment under both adverse selection and moral hazard. Manufacturers dealing with (exclusive) competing retailers may prefer to leave contracts silent on retail prices, whenever other aspects of the retailers' activity remain nonverifiable. Two effects are at play when moving from retail price maintenance to quantity forcing. First, restricting screening possibilities may increase retailers' rent. Second, such a restriction affects downstream competition. This latter effect may justify using quantity forcing contracts and, more generally, shed light on a novel source of contractual incompleteness.
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American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, 2010, 2 (1), pp.204-229. 〈10.1257/mic.2.1.204〉
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Soumis le : mardi 20 novembre 2012 - 09:43:06
Dernière modification le : vendredi 15 mars 2013 - 14:14:37

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David Martimort, Salvatore  piccolo. The Strategic Value of Quantity Forcing Contracts. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, 2010, 2 (1), pp.204-229. 〈10.1257/mic.2.1.204〉. 〈halshs-00754478〉

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