"When Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?": New Insights from Asymmetric Information when Supply Chains Compete

Abstract : We study a model of competing manufacturer/retailer pairs where adverse selection and moral hazard are coupled with promotional externalities at the downstream level. In contrast to earlier models mainly focusing on a bilateral monopoly setting, we show that with competing brands a 'laissez-faire' approach towards vertical price control might not always promote productive efficiency. Giving manufacturers freedom to control retail prices is more likely to harm consumers when retailers impose positive promotional externalities on each other, and the converse is true otherwise. Our simple model also suggests that, with competing supply chains, consumers and manufacturers might prefer different contractual modes if promotional externalities have substantial effects on demands.
Type de document :
Article dans une revue
Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, Wiley, 2011, 20 (3), pp.649-677. 〈10.1111/j.1530-9134.2011.00300.x〉
Liste complète des métadonnées

https://hal-pjse.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00754510
Contributeur : Caroline Bauer <>
Soumis le : mardi 20 novembre 2012 - 09:50:27
Dernière modification le : mardi 24 avril 2018 - 17:20:14

Lien texte intégral

Identifiants

Collections

Citation

Jakub Kastl, David Martimort, Salvatore Piccolo. "When Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?": New Insights from Asymmetric Information when Supply Chains Compete. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, Wiley, 2011, 20 (3), pp.649-677. 〈10.1111/j.1530-9134.2011.00300.x〉. 〈halshs-00754510〉

Partager

Métriques

Consultations de la notice

256