Feedback Spillover and Analogy-based Expectations. A Multi-Game Experiment

Abstract : We consider a multi-game interactive learning environment in which subjects sometimes only have access to the aggregate distribution of play of the opponents over the various games and sometimes are told the joint distribution of actions and games in a more or less accessible way. Our main findings are: 1) In the presence of feedback spillover, long run behaviors stabilize to an analogy-based expectation equilibrium (Jehiel, 2005). 2) Faced with the same objective feedback, the long run behaviors are sometimes better described by Nash equilibrium and sometimes they are better described by the analogy-based expectation equilibrium depending on the accessibility of the feedback.
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Submitted on : Tuesday, November 20, 2012 - 9:53:59 AM
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Steffen Huck, Philippe Jehiel, Tom Rutter. Feedback Spillover and Analogy-based Expectations. A Multi-Game Experiment. Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, 2011, 71 (2), pp.351-365. ⟨10.1016/j.geb.2010.06.007⟩. ⟨halshs-00754551⟩

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