Patent Office and Innovation Policy: Nobody's perfect

Abstract : The number of patent applications and "bad" patents issued has been rising rapidly in recent years. Based on this trend, we study the overload problem within the Patent Office and its consequences on the firms' R&D incentives. We assume that the examination process of patent applications is imperfect, and that its quality is poorer under congestion. Depending on policy instruments such as submission fees and the toughness of the non-obviousness requirement, the system may result in a high-R&D equilibrium, in which firms self-select in their patent applications, or in an equilibrium with low R&D, opportunistic patent applications and the issuance of bad patents. Multiple equilibria often co-exist, which deeply undermines the effectiveness of policy instruments. We investigate the robustness of our conclusions as to how the value of patent protection is formalized, taking into consideration the introduction of a penalty system for rejected patent applications, as well as the role of commitment to a given patent protection policy.
Type de document :
Article dans une revue
International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, 2011, 29 (2), pp.242-252. 〈10.1016/j.ijindorg.2010.06.002〉
Liste complète des métadonnées

https://hal-pjse.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00754554
Contributeur : Caroline Bauer <>
Soumis le : mardi 20 novembre 2012 - 09:54:08
Dernière modification le : mardi 24 avril 2018 - 17:20:14

Identifiants

Collections

Citation

Bernard Caillaud, Anne Duchêne. Patent Office and Innovation Policy: Nobody's perfect. International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, 2011, 29 (2), pp.242-252. 〈10.1016/j.ijindorg.2010.06.002〉. 〈halshs-00754554〉

Partager

Métriques

Consultations de la notice

335