Taxes, minimum-quality standards and/or product labeling to improve environmental quality and welfare: Experiments can provide answers

Abstract : This study focuses on the welfare impact of taxes, minimum-quality standards, and/or product labeling. A theoretical framework shows that the combination of a label and a per-unit tax is socially optimal. Alternatively, if the label is unavailable, the theory cannot directly conclude which instrument should be socially preferred. Estimations of willingness-to-pay (WTP) are useful for completing the theoretical analysis and evaluating policies ex ante on case-by-case basis. Using hypothetical WTP for shrimp, we confirm that the combination of a label and a tax is socially optimal. In the absence of a label, simulations show that a minimum-quality standard leads to a higher welfare compared to a tax.
Type de document :
Article dans une revue
Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer Verlag, 2012, 41 (3), pp.337-357. 〈10.1007/s11149-011-9167-y〉
Liste complète des métadonnées

https://hal-pjse.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00754589
Contributeur : Caroline Bauer <>
Soumis le : mardi 20 novembre 2012 - 09:56:39
Dernière modification le : mercredi 3 octobre 2018 - 20:58:02

Lien texte intégral

Identifiants

Citation

Anne-Célia Disdier, Stéphan Marette. Taxes, minimum-quality standards and/or product labeling to improve environmental quality and welfare: Experiments can provide answers. Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer Verlag, 2012, 41 (3), pp.337-357. 〈10.1007/s11149-011-9167-y〉. 〈halshs-00754589〉

Partager

Métriques

Consultations de la notice

424