The Econometrics of Auctions with asymmetric anonymous bidders

Abstract : We consider standard auction models when bidders' identities are not-or are only partially-observed by the econometrician. We first adapt the definition of identifiability to a framework with anonymous bids and explore the extent to which anonymity reduces the possibility of identifying private value auction models. Second, in the asymmetric independent private value model which is nonparametrically identified, we generalize Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong's estimation procedure [Optimal nonparametric estimation of first-price auctions, Econometrica 68 (2000) 525-574] and consider the asymptotic properties of our multi-step kernel-based estimator. Monte Carlo simulations illustrate the practical relevance of our estimation procedure in small data sets.
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Article dans une revue
Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, 2012, 167 (1), pp.113-132. 〈10.1016/j.jeconom.2011.10.007〉
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Soumis le : mardi 20 novembre 2012 - 09:57:37
Dernière modification le : mardi 24 avril 2018 - 17:20:14

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Laurent Lamy. The Econometrics of Auctions with asymmetric anonymous bidders. Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, 2012, 167 (1), pp.113-132. 〈10.1016/j.jeconom.2011.10.007〉. 〈halshs-00754606〉

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