An Exploration of Type Indeterminacy in Strategic Decision-making

Abstract : In this paper we explore an extension of the Type Indeterminacy model of decision-making to strategic decision-making. A 2×2 game is investigated. We first show that in a one-shot simultaneous move setting the TI-model is equivalent to the standard Bayes-Harsanyi model. We then let the game be preceded by a cheap-talk promise game. We show in an example that in the TI-model the promise stage can have an impact on the next following behavior when the standard Bayes-Harsanyi model predicts no impact whatsoever. The TI approach differs from other behavioral approaches in identifying the source of the effect of cheap-talk promises in the intrinsic indeterminacy of the players' type.
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Article dans une revue
Quantum Interaction, 2009, pp.113-128
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Soumis le : mardi 20 novembre 2012 - 10:01:43
Dernière modification le : mardi 24 avril 2018 - 17:20:09


  • HAL Id : halshs-00754784, version 1



Jérôme Busemeyer, Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky. An Exploration of Type Indeterminacy in Strategic Decision-making. Quantum Interaction, 2009, pp.113-128. 〈halshs-00754784〉



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