R. Alonso and N. Matouschek, Relational delegation, The RAND Journal of Economics, vol.38, issue.4, pp.1070-1089, 2007.
DOI : 10.1111/j.0741-6261.2007.00126.x

P. Antràs and C. F. Foley, Poultry in Motion: A Study of International Trade Finance Practices, Journal of Political Economy, vol.123, issue.4, pp.853-901, 2015.
DOI : 10.1086/681592

M. Armstrong and J. Vickers, Regulatory reform in telecommunications in Central and Eastern Europe, The Economics of Transition, vol.2, issue.3, pp.295-318, 1996.
DOI : 10.2307/2555431

A. Banerjee, S. Mullainathan, and R. Hanna, Corruption In The Handbook of Organizational Economics, pp.1109-1147, 2013.

E. C. Banfield, Corruption as a Feature of Governmental Organization, The Journal of Law and Economics, vol.18, issue.3, pp.587-605, 1975.
DOI : 10.1086/466826

S. Blader, C. Gartenberg, R. Henderson, and A. Prat, The Real Effects of Relational Contracts, American Economic Review, vol.105, issue.5, pp.452-56, 2015.
DOI : 10.1257/aer.p20151002

N. Bloom, B. Eifert, A. Mahajan, D. Mckenzie, and J. Roberts, Does Management Matter? Evidence from India *, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol.128, issue.1, pp.1-51, 2013.
DOI : 10.1093/qje/qjs044

N. Bloom, R. Sadun, and J. Van-reenen, The Organization of Firms Across Countries, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol.127, issue.4, pp.1663-1705, 2012.
DOI : 10.1093/qje/qje029

S. Board, Relational Contracts and the Value of Loyalty, American Economic Review, vol.101, issue.7, pp.3349-3367, 2011.
DOI : 10.1257/aer.101.7.3349

G. Calzolari and G. Spagnolo, Relational contracts and competitive screening, 2009.

S. Chassang, Building Routines: Learning, Cooperation, and the Dynamics of Incomplete Relational Contracts, American Economic Review, vol.100, issue.1, pp.448-465, 2010.
DOI : 10.1257/aer.100.1.448

. Chassang, G. Sylvain, . Padró, and . Miquel, Corruption, Intimidation , and Whistle-blowing: a Theory of Inference from Unverifiable Reports, National Bureau of Economic Research NBER Working Paper, 2014.
DOI : 10.3386/w20315

S. Cole and A. Tran, Evidence from the Firm: A New Approach to Understanding Corruption, In International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption, pp.408-427, 2011.
DOI : 10.4337/9780857936523.00024

D. Coviello, A. Guglielmo, and G. Spagnolo, The Effect of Discretion on Procurement Performance, Management Science, 2016.
DOI : 10.1287/mnsc.2016.2628

A. Estache and L. Wren-lewis, Toward a Theory of Regulation for Developing Countries: Following Jean-Jacques Laffont's Lead, Journal of Economic Literature, vol.47, issue.3, pp.729-770, 2009.
DOI : 10.1257/jel.47.3.729

J. Evans, P. Levine, and F. Trillas, Lobbies, delegation and the under-investment problem in regulation, International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol.26, issue.1, pp.17-40, 2008.
DOI : 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2006.09.003

J. A. Fairburn, M. James, and . Malcomson, Performance, Promotion, and the Peter Principle, The Review of Economic Studies, vol.68, issue.1, pp.45-66, 2001.
DOI : 10.1111/1467-937X.00159

Y. Fong and J. Li, Relational contracts, limited liability, and employment dynamics, Journal of Economic Theory, vol.169, 2015.
DOI : 10.1016/j.jet.2017.02.006

P. Francois and J. Roberts, Contracting Productivity Growth, Review of Economic Studies, vol.70, issue.1, pp.59-85, 2003.
DOI : 10.1111/1467-937X.00237

R. Gibbons and R. Henderson, 17. What Do Managers Do? Exploring Persistent Performance Differences among Seemingly Similar Enterprises, The Handbook of Organizational Economics, pp.680-731, 2013.
DOI : 10.1515/9781400845354-019

. Goldï-ucke, S. Susanne, and . Kranz, Delegation, monitoring, and relational contracts, Economics Letters, vol.117, issue.2, pp.405-407, 2012.
DOI : 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.06.019

. Goldï-ucke, S. Susanne, and . Kranz, Renegotiation-proof relational contracts, Games and Economic Behavior, vol.80, pp.157-178, 2013.
DOI : 10.1016/j.geb.2013.02.009

B. E. Hermalin, Why Whine about Wining and Dining?, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, vol.32, issue.1, 2015.
DOI : 10.1093/jleo/ewv008

M. L. Katz, Game-Playing Agents: Unobservable Contracts as Precommitments, The RAND Journal of Economics, vol.22, issue.3, pp.307-328, 1991.
DOI : 10.2307/2601049

J. Lambsdorff, S. Graf, and . Teksoz, Corrupt relational contracting, The New Institutional Economics of Corruption, 2005.
DOI : 10.1017/CBO9780511492617.010

J. Levin, Relational Incentive Contracts, American Economic Review, vol.93, issue.3, pp.835-857, 2003.
DOI : 10.1257/000282803322157115

. Lewis-faupel, Y. Sean, . Neggers, A. Benjamin, R. Olken et al., Can Electronic Procurement Improve Infrastructure Provision? Evidence from Public Works in India and Indonesia, American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 2016.

G. Lichand, F. Marcos, . Lopes, C. Marcelo, and . Medeiros, Is Corruption Good For Your Health, 2016.

J. Li, N. Matouschek, and M. Powell, Power Dynamics in Organizations, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, vol.9, issue.1, pp.Forthcom- ing, 2016.
DOI : 10.1257/mic.20150138

R. Macchiavello and A. Morjaria, The Value of Relationships: Evidence from a Supply Shock to Kenyan Rose Exports, American Economic Review, vol.105, issue.9, pp.2911-2956, 2015.
DOI : 10.1257/aer.20120141

J. M. Malcomson, Relational Incentive Contracts In The Handbook of Organizational Economics, pp.1014-1065, 2013.

D. Martimort, The Life Cycle of Regulatory Agencies: Dynamic Capture and Transaction Costs, Review of Economic Studies, vol.66, issue.4, pp.929-947, 1999.
DOI : 10.1111/1467-937X.00114

D. Martimort and T. Verdier, The Agency Cost of Internal Collusion and Schumpeterian Growth, Review of Economic Studies, vol.71, issue.4, pp.1119-1141, 2004.
DOI : 10.1111/0034-6527.00316

P. R. Milgrom, Employment Contracts, Influence Activities, and Efficient Organization Design, Journal of Political Economy, vol.96, issue.1, pp.42-60, 1988.
DOI : 10.1086/261523

D. A. Miller and J. Watson, A Theory of Disagreement in Repeated Games with Bargaining, Econometrica, vol.81, issue.6, pp.2303-2350, 2013.

A. Millington, M. Eberhardt, and B. Wilkinson, Gift Giving, Guanxi and Illicit Payments in Buyer???Supplier Relations in China: Analysing the Experience of UK Companies, Journal of Business Ethics, vol.3, issue.3, pp.255-268, 2005.
DOI : 10.1007/s10551-004-6712-y

G. Nkamleu, B. D. Blaise, and . Kamgnia, Uses and Abuses of Per-diems in Africa: A Political Economy of Travel Allowances African Development Bank Group, 2014.

T. E. Olsen and G. Torsvik, Collusion and Renegotiation in Hierarchies: A Case of Beneficial Corruption, International Economic Review, vol.39, issue.2, pp.413-438, 1998.
DOI : 10.2307/2527300

J. Palguta and F. Pertold, Manipulation and Active Waste in Public Procurement: Evidence from the Introduction of Discretionary Thresholds, 2015.

I. Rasul and D. Rogger, Management of Bureaucrats and Public Service Delivery: Evidence from the Nigerian Civil Service, The Economic Journal, 2016.
DOI : 10.1111/ecoj.12418

D. Ray, The Time Structure of Self-Enforcing Agreements, Econometrica, vol.70, issue.2, pp.547-582, 2002.
DOI : 10.1111/1468-0262.00295

L. Rayo, Relational Incentives and Moral Hazard in Teams, Review of Economic Studies, vol.74, issue.3, pp.937-963, 2007.
DOI : 10.1111/j.1467-937X.2007.00443.x

M. Schramm and M. Taube, The Institutional Economics of Legal Institutions, Guanxi, and Corruption in the PR China, Fighting Corruption in Asia: Causes, Effects, and Remedies, pp.271-96, 2003.
DOI : 10.1142/9789812795397_0011

G. Spagnolo, Managerial incentives and collusive behavior, European Economic Review, vol.49, issue.6, pp.1501-1523, 2005.
DOI : 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2004.05.003

G. Spagnolo, Reputation, competition, and entry in procurement, International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol.30, issue.3, pp.291-296, 2012.
DOI : 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2012.01.001

R. Strausz, Delegation of Monitoring in a Principal-Agent Relationship, The Review of Economic Studies, vol.64, issue.3, pp.337-357, 1997.
DOI : 10.2307/2971717

V. Thiele, Subjective Performance Evaluations, Collusion, and Organizational Design, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, vol.29, issue.1, pp.35-59, 2013.
DOI : 10.1093/jleo/ewr021