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, How many programs did you apply for outside the DoSV? Please provide the number

, Which subjects did you apply for through the DoSV? [The list of all subjects grouped in clusters was shown

, Did you apply to some universities in the hope of going there with your friends?

, How many offers have you already received? Please consider both offers inside the DoSV and outside of it

, If you have already received an offer, please answer questions 7, 8, 9, and 10. If not, please proceed with question 11

, Please remember the situation when you submitted your applications to the universities in the DoSV. We would like to know how well you knew at this point how to rank your applications, that is, which application was your most preferred, your second preferred, etc. How accurate are the following statements regarding your situation back then with respect to your preference order?, vol.13

, ? I had a clear ranking with respect to my preferences

, ? I did not have a clear ranking since I still needed to collect information in order to rank my applications according to my preferences

, ? I did not have a clear ranking since I did not know where my friends were going

, Getting to a ranking was very difficult, and I wanted to postpone this decision for as long as possible

, If no, please provide us with the reasons

, ? I did not know that it was possible to change the ranking

, ? I was happy with the initial ranking of the DoSV

, ? I missed the deadline before which it was possible to change the ranking

, ? I did not have a clear ranking of my applications

, ? I assume that the ranking has no effect on the likelihood of being admitted

, Has your ranking changed between the beginning of the procedure on July, vol.15

, If yes, what were the reasons for changing your ranking?

, ? I did not have a ranking at the beginning of the procedure when I submitted my applications

?. , via the internet?

?. , from students of these universities? ? ... from your school teachers?

?. , from your parents or other members of your family? ?

, Which of the following reasons have played a role for your selection of programs and universities and for your ranking of them?

, ? The fit between the program offered by the university and my own interests. ? The geographical proximity to my parents

, ? The geographical proximity to my friends

, ? Job market considerations

, Whether my application has a chance of being successful at this university. ? Other reasons