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Absorptive Capacity, Knowledge Spillovers and Incentive Contracts

Abstract : We attempt to identify and measure potential knowledge spillovers in the French urban transport sector, which is strongly regulated and where a few large corporations are in charge of operating several urban networks simultaneously. We build and estimate a structural cost model where the service is regulated by a local government and is provided by a single operator. Knowledge spillovers are directly linked to the know-how of a specific corporation, but they also depend on the incentive power of the regulatory contract which shapes the effort of the local managers. Exerting an effort in a specific network allows a cost reduction in this network, but it also benefit other networks that are members of the same corporation. Our model provides us with estimates of the operators' absorptive capacity, which is their in-house knowledge power in order to optimally benefit from spillovers. We find that diversity of knowledge across operators of a same corporation improves absorptive capacity and increases the flow of spillovers. Simulation exercises provide evidence of significant reductions in total operating cost following the enlargement of industrial groups.
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Preprints, Working Papers, ...
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Contributor : Caroline Bauer <>
Submitted on : Thursday, January 14, 2021 - 8:56:37 PM
Last modification on : Tuesday, January 19, 2021 - 11:09:09 AM
Long-term archiving on: : Thursday, April 15, 2021 - 7:32:00 PM


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  • HAL Id : halshs-03110851, version 1



Luis Aguiar, Philippe Gagnepain. Absorptive Capacity, Knowledge Spillovers and Incentive Contracts. 2021. ⟨halshs-03110851⟩



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