p-Best response set

Abstract : This paper introduces a notion of p-best response set (p-BR). We build on this notion in order to provide a new set-valued concept: the minimal p-best response set (p-MBR). After proving general existence results of the p-MBR, we show that it characterizes set-valued stability concepts in a dynamic with Poisson revision opportunities borrowed from Matsui and Matsuyama [An approach to equilibrium selection, J. Econ. Theory 65 (1995) 415-434.] Then, we study equilibrium selection. In particular, using our notion of p-BR, we generalize Morris et al. [p-Dominance and belief potential, Econometrica 63 (1995) 145-157.] that aimed to provide sufficient conditions under which a unique equilibrium is selected in the presence of higher order uncertainty.
Type de document :
Article dans une revue
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, 2006, 131 (1), pp.45-70. 〈10.1016/j.jet.2005.06.001〉
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Soumis le : mardi 20 novembre 2012 - 08:44:05
Dernière modification le : mardi 24 avril 2018 - 17:20:09




Olivier Tercieux. p-Best response set. Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, 2006, 131 (1), pp.45-70. 〈10.1016/j.jet.2005.06.001〉. 〈halshs-00754120〉



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