Mixed Bundling Auctions

Abstract : We study multi-object auctions where agents have private and additive valuations for heterogeneous objects. We focus on the revenue properties of a class of dominant strategy mechanisms where a weight is assigned to each partition of objects. The weights influence the probability with which partitions are chosen in the mechanism. This class contains efficient auctions, pure bundling auctions, mixed bundling auctions, auctions with reserve prices and auctions with pre-packaged bundles. For any number of objects and bidders, both the pure bundling auction and separate, efficient auctions for the single objects are revenue-inferior to an auction that involves mixed bundling.
Type de document :
Article dans une revue
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, 2007, 134 (1), pp.494-512. 〈10.1016/j.jet.2006.02.001〉
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Soumis le : mardi 20 novembre 2012 - 08:49:54
Dernière modification le : mardi 24 avril 2018 - 17:20:09

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Philippe Jehiel, Moritz Meyer-Ter-Vehn, Benny Moldovanu. Mixed Bundling Auctions. Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, 2007, 134 (1), pp.494-512. 〈10.1016/j.jet.2006.02.001〉. 〈halshs-00754233〉



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