On "Acquisition of information in Financial Markets"

Abstract : In their paper "Information Acquisition in Financial Markets" (this journal, 2000), Barlevy and Veronesi present a model of a one-period financial market, and claim that for an open set of parameter values, the value of information increases with the mass of informed agents. That claim is shown here to be false. The property of strategic substitution is robust in their model.
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Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press (OUP), 2008, 75 (4), pp.1081-1084. 〈10.1111/j.1467-937X.2008.00502.x〉
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Soumis le : mardi 20 novembre 2012 - 08:51:39
Dernière modification le : mardi 24 avril 2018 - 17:20:09

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Christophe Chamley. On "Acquisition of information in Financial Markets". Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press (OUP), 2008, 75 (4), pp.1081-1084. 〈10.1111/j.1467-937X.2008.00502.x〉. 〈halshs-00754259〉

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