Ability and Knowledge

Abstract : In games with incomplete information, more information to a player implies a broader strategy set for this player in the normal form game, hence more knowledge implies more ability. We prove that, conversely, given two normal form games G and G′ such that players in a subset J of the set of players possess more strategies in G′ than in G, there exist two games with incomplete information with normal forms G and G′ such that players in J are more informed in the second than in the first. More ability can then be rationalized by more knowledge, and our result thus establishes the formal equivalence between ability and knowledge.
Document type :
Journal articles
Complete list of metadatas

https://hal-pjse.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00754449
Contributor : Caroline Bauer <>
Submitted on : Tuesday, November 20, 2012 - 9:41:02 AM
Last modification on : Tuesday, April 24, 2018 - 5:20:14 PM

Identifiers

Collections

Citation

Olivier Gossner. Ability and Knowledge. Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, 2010, 69, pp.95-106. ⟨10.1016/j.geb.2009.10.011⟩. ⟨halshs-00754449⟩

Share

Metrics

Record views

286