On minimal ascending auctions with payment discounts

Abstract : The literature on ascending combinatorial auctions yields conflicting insights regarding the possibility to implement the Vickrey payoffs for general valuations. We introduce the class of minimal ascending auctions, a class which allows one to disconnect the final payments from the final bids but which prohibits the raising of the price vector of a provisionally winning bidder. We first establish the impossibility of implementing the Vickrey payoffs for general valuations. Second, we propose a minimal ascending auction that yields a bidder-optimal competitive equilibrium thanks to payment discounts.
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Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, 2012, 75 (2), pp.990-999. 〈10.1016/j.geb.2012.02.005〉
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Soumis le : mardi 20 novembre 2012 - 09:56:16
Dernière modification le : mardi 24 avril 2018 - 17:20:14

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Laurent Lamy. On minimal ascending auctions with payment discounts. Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, 2012, 75 (2), pp.990-999. 〈10.1016/j.geb.2012.02.005〉. 〈halshs-00754581〉

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